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Harold A. Linstone* 
The author begins by presenting a critical assess-
ment of some aspects of what he refers to as the 
traditional perspective of analysis, which he feels has 
permeated virtually every facet of development 
planning. Some of these aspects are the shared 
understanding of problems, the search for optimal 
solutions, a reliance on abstract models, quantifica-
tion and predictability, the possibility of determining 
objective truth and the assumption that time is linear 
and objective. 
Based on his critique of these aspects, the author 
underscores the need for multiple perspectives, 
arguing that the traditional approach should be com-
plemented by organizational/societal and personal/ 
individual perspectives. He goes on to explain how 
they differ from one another as regards, inter alia, 
their world view, the goals they set, the modes of 
inquiry they suggest and the type of planning they 
foster. 
These three perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive; on the contrary, the traditional perspec-
tive is particularly useful when applied to the choice 
of policy options, while the others play a decisive role 
in effective implementation. Theorganizational/so-
cietal perspective permits a better orientation of 
planning processes and greater effectiveness because 
it brings socio-institutional factors into considera-
tion, while the personal/individual perspective 
results in greater dynamism because it provides for 
the identification and utilization of vital individual 
talents. 
•Director of the Futures Research Institute of Por-
tland State.University, United States. 
•The views expressed in this article are the sole 
responsibility of the author and do not necessarily coincide 
with those of the Organization. 
Introduction 
The use of various analytical approaches in the 
public sector during the 1970s presented the 
planner with an array of impressive global com-
puter models, ranging from The Limits of 
Growth to Global 2000. As Jay Forrester 
(1971:18) observed in his influential World 
Dynamics, 
"All systems that change through time can 
be represented by using only levels and rates. 
The two kinds of variables are necessary but 
at the same time sufficient for representing 
any system." 
In the private sector, corporate planning 
groups flourished and strategic planning focused 
on econometric forecasts, business unit models, 
growth and market share matrices, and expe-
rience curves. 
A decade later, disillusionment is wides-
pread. Consider the following headlines con-
cerning strategic planning in the private sector: 
"The Real World Strikes Back: Corporate 
Strategists under Fire." 
Fortune, 27 December 1982 
"The (Economic) Forecasters Flunk: Poor 
predictions give once prestigious pundits a 
dismal reputation." 
Time, 27 August 1984 
"The New Breed of Strategic Planner: 
Number-crunching professionals are giving 
way to Une managers." 
Business Week, 17 September 1984 
And if>th,e public sector: 
"The more ambitious the model, the more 
likely is the fraternity of futurists to ignore 
fatal flaws and defer to it as a landmark." 
(Hoos, 1983:236) 
"In World Dynamics and The Limits to 
Growth the scope is unbounded but the 
insights are slight." 
(Berlinski, 1976:85) 
There is recognition that real-life planning 
must deal with ill-structured or "unruly" prob-
lems, rather than with well-structured or "tame" 
ones. As a result, a recent United Nations-
supported study 
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"reject(s) the 'grand design' approach to 
development. 'Grand design' solutions are 
appropfiate only when there is a shared 
understanding of 'the problem' and com-
plete knowledge of the causes of 'the 
problem'." 
(Thompson and Warburton, 1985:10) 
Let us consider some of the familiar characteris-
tics of science and technology-based analysis 
methodology and set them in the context of 
development planning: 
1. Shared understanding of the "problem" 
There is a single definition of the problem to be 
"solved". There is agreement on the objectives 
or goals. In fact, a cultural homogeneity must be 
assumed which does not exist in development 
planning problems encountered in the real 
world. Each interested party may define the 
"problem" differently and have conflicting 
objectives. 
2. Search for the "best" or optimal solution 
Cost-benefit analysis and linear programming 
are typical of this type of search. Organizations 
do not usually seek optimal solutions; they have 
an agenda, and they seek a workable solution to 
the top problem so that they can move on to the 
next one. 
3- Abstraction or reductionism; 
reliance on models 
Forrester's world dynamics model offers an 
example of this process. His model contains only 
five levels: population, pollution, natural resour-
ces, capital investment, and capital investment 
in agriculture. Assuming only one interaction 
between any two subsets of these five elements, 
We shall first examine the familiar analytic 
approach and then propose a means to cope with 
its weaknesses, indeed to bridge the gap between 
the modeler and the real world, between analysis 
and action. 
there would be almost one thousand possible 
interactions. (The formula is (2n - l)2, where n 
is the number of elements; in this case the for-
mula yields a total of 961.) In reality there are, of 
course, multiple interactions possible between 
any two subsets, so the number given here is a 
lower limit. The simplifying assumptions that 1 ) 
n = 5 would yield a meaningful image of the 
world and that 2) the stucture of the model 
would remain invariant over the 200-year model 
run, stretch the bounds of credulity. Indeed, the 
superficially impressive number of equations 
used in the world model gives a misleading aura 
of model sophistication and masks the "ineffable 
innocence" of the analysis (Berlinski, 1976:83). 
Econometric models may contain up to 
1 000 equations but executives, using their intui-
tion, usually beat the models in short-term fore-
casting. As Ascher's examination (1978) 
concluded, the core assumptions are much more 
crucial to forecast accuracy than the model 
sophistication. 
"Economic journals are filled with mathem-
atical formulas leading the reader from sets 
of more or less plausible but entirely arbi-
trary assumptions to precisely stated but 
irrelevant theoretical conclusions." 
(W. Leontief, 1973 Nobel Laureate ¡n 
Economics, quoted in Time, 
27 August 1984:43) 
4. Reliance on data 
The urge for quantification, a hallmark of 
science and technology, has also bcome perva-
sive in planning. The principle: If it cannot be 
quantified, it cannot be very important and may 
be neglected. Even when experts do present 
I 
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quantified facts, there may be enormous varia-
tion. Per capita fuel consumption rate estimates 
developed by experts for one recent United 
Nations-supported study varied by a factor of 67 
(Thompson and Warburton, 1985:5). 
Measures are used for the future because 
they were appropriate in the past. Gross 
national product is a suitable measure for an 
industrial society; it is of questionable value for a 
pre-industrial as well as post-industrial society. 
The concept of the "job" may need to be rede-
fined in an information era. 
5. Predictability 
Prigogine et al. (1977) found that a system shift-
ing from one stable phase to another experien-
ces temporary "macroscopic indeterminacy". 
The new state may depend on a single given 
fluctuation that is itself of no significance. 
Another aspect has to do with increasing 
technological complexity and is directly related 
to the discussion in section 3 above. A system 
which consists of many elements, and therefore 
many interactions, also has many possibilities of 
failure. Proper design can reduce the possibili-
ties of failure, but cannot eliminate them. The 
situation is particularly serious when the cou-
pling or linkage between its subsystems is so 
tight that subunits cannot be separated in the 
event of an accident (Perrow, 1984). 
If the consequence of failure is catastrophic 
and unacceptable to society, then traditional 
probability calculus is irrelevant. An event with a 
small likelihood, say, 10"5, but resulting in 107 
fatalities if it does occur, has a calculated 
expected value of 102 deaths. Such a prediction is 
clearly meaningless. The evolving world has an 
increasing number of such complex systems 
with the potential of catastrophic failure; Three 
Mile Island, Bhopal and Chernobyl are recent 
examples. 
Impact assessment has proven to be more 
difficult than forecasting. The technology of the 
spinning wheel had an impact on mass commun-
ications; the technology of the chimney had an 
impact on social stratification (White, 1974). 
Today we ponder the impact of information 
technology. Will it mean more centralization or 
more decentralization? Will it worsen the han-
dicap of illiteracy or move us back to audiovisual 
learning? 
6. Objectivity 
It is assumed that the planner is an objective 
observer and that truth is observer-invariant. In 
the complex real world, virtually everything 
interacts with everything else, and this includes 
the planner. The individual is unique and makes 
a difference. 
"To be able to see the world globally, which 
you are going to have to be able to do, and to 
see it as a world of unique individuals... that 
is really complexity." 
(Churchman, 1977:90) 
7. Time 
Time is assumed to move linearly at a universally 
accepted pace, with no consideration of differen-
tial time perceptions, planning horizons, and 
discount rates. The experiments of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) demonstrate how human 
beings apply a psychological discount rate to 
their own past and thus distort the integration of 
their own experience, that is, the subjective 
probability. Recent events tend to be over-
stressed in comparison to more remote ones. 
Similarly, we look at the future as if through the 
wrong end of a telescope: distant crises or oppor-
tunities appear smaller than they actually are. 
Such discounting of the future drastically affects 
the choice between project alternatives. 
The planner often exhibits a discounting 
tendency in focusing on the analysis and neglect-
ing the subsequent implementation of his or her 
plan. It is often a fatal flaw. 
Having briefly described the inadequacies of 
the traditional perspective —which we shall 
label the technical (or T) perspective— the use 
of multiple perspectives to overcome its limita-
tions may be proposed. 
46 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April ¡987 
II 
Multiple perspectives 
Graham Allison's probing study of the Cuban 
missile crisis (1971) provided the stimulus for 
the introduction and development of the multi-
ple perspective concept. We use three types of 
perspectives: the technical (or T) perspective 
outlined in section I, the organizational/societal 
(or O) approach, and the personal/individual 
(or P) focus. Table 1 compares their main char-
acteristics. Any complex system can be viewed 
from diverse perspectives. For example, an 
organization may be viewed from the T perspec-
tive, as Forrester (1961) did in analysing the 
firm using his system dynamics, or from the O 
perspective, as MachiavelH did in his guidelines 
for rulers (more recently adapted to the modern 
corporation by Jay, 1968). Physical risk may be 
viewed from a T perspective (probabilistic risk 
analysis) or a P perspective (perceived risk). 
Each perspective yields insights not provided by 
the others. 
There are usually several important O and P 
perspectives, representing affected and affecting 
organizational and individual actors. The 
decision-maker has his own process of integrat-
ing the perspectives. Searching for a weighting 
formula would be as futile as asking an executive 
how he weighs the input he receives from his 
staff, his department heads, and his personal 
friends in reaching a major decision on a new 
line of business. It is usually desirable to present 
the different perspectives together with a proto-
type integration (analogous to a courtroom trial, 
where the testimony of the witnesses is followed 
by the summations of the prosecutor and defense 
attorney). A most important task is the probing 
of the interplay of perspectives, some support-
ing, others conflicting in nature. 
It should be noted that individuals who are 
excellent in pursuing the T perspective are not 
necessarily so good at developing O or P pers-
pectives. The hard or soft science training that 
usually forms a solid base for T is by no means 
ideal for O or P. The modes of inquiry 
(Churchman, 1971) are quite different: thedata-
and model-based modes of T give way to the 
d i a l e c t i c / a d v e r s a r y and n e g o t i a t e d -
reality/consensual modes of O, and the intuitive, 
experiential, and learning modes of P. Input for 
O and P is obtained in personal, in-depth inter-
views, rather than being drawn from written 
reports. 
In planning activities the T perspective 
plays the dominant role in the decision-maker's 
consideration of alternative directions but the O 
and P perspectives become crucial for effective 
implementation. The analyst's preoccupation 
with T readily explains his or her frequent disin-
terest in the implementation of the plan. The O 
and P perspectives also necessarily involve deal-
ing with people, either in groups or as individu-
als —an aspect with which the ivory-tower. 
planner is often uncomfortable. 
In their analysis of political forecasting, 
Ascher and Overholt sweep in both O and P 
perspectives. They make clear distinctions 
between the policy-maker's "rational informa-
tion needs" (that is, the meaning of information, 
the degree of certainty) and his or her political 
needs. They explain the political needs as fol-
lows: 1) to be a convincing advocate of preferred 
policies; 2) whenever possible, to choose poli-
cies which, if implemented, produce positive 
results; 3) to ensure that, when wrong, they are 
not disastrously so; 4) when wrong, to minimize 
the blame focused on the policy-maker; and 5) to 
maintain his or her decision-making discretion 
(1983:45). They recognize that quantitative 
indices are deceptively hazardous, that the law of 
large numbers, aggregate statistical techniques, 
and linear relationships are inappropriate. The 
O perspective is their "central metaphor" and 
concern for the P perspective is reflected in 
statements such as the following: 
"long-range strategic thinking is qualita-
tively different from short-range tactical 
thinking —frequently to the extent of 
requiring different personalities... 
for the analyst the use of sophisticated 
methods brings several rewards: personal 
feelings of mastery,... peer approval, (and) 
persuasiveness to the extent that the scien-
tific aura of complex methods makes the 
results seem 'scientific'." 
(Ascher and Overholt, 1983:40,52) 
Thompson and Warburton (1985:7) analyse 
development planning in the Himalayas and 
conclude: 






Science- tech no logy 
Rationality 
















P r o d u c t ( s t u d y , d e s i g n , 
explanation) 
Abstraction and modeling 
Data and analysis 
Technological time 
Far 
Often little breadth 
Minimal 
Problem simplification by lim-
iting variables, relations 
Cause and effect 
Need for validation, replicabil-
ity (or "audit trail") 
Objectivity emphasized 
Prediction 
Optimization (best solution) 
Feedback loops recognized 
Quantification 
Use of averages, probabilities 
Trade-offs 
Uncertaint ies noted: many 
caveats ("on one hand...") 
Communication Technical report, briefing 
Stability and continuity 
Process 









Problem delegation to others 
or avoidance if possible 
Agenda ("problems of the 
moment") 
Bureaucracy often pervasive 
Political sensitivity and 
expediency 
Loyalties, credentials 
Restricted access by outsiders 
(caste) or recruited members 
(sect) 
R e a s o n a b l e n e s s , c o m m o n 
advantage 
Recognition of partial 
unpredictability 
Long-range planning often 
ritualized 
Satisfactory solution (first 
acceptable, rather than best, 
solution) 
Inc r emen ta l change, slow 
adaptation 
Parochial priorities 
Standard operating procedures 
Compromise and bargaining 
Monitoring and correction 
Uncertainties avoided 
Fear of error 
Di rec t ive , conference, 
interviews 
Private language with insiders 
H o r t a t o r y language wi th 
public 
Power, influence, prestige 
S t a t u s m a i n t e n a n c e o r 
improvement 






High (with rare exceptions) 
Hierarchy of individual needs 
(security, acceptance, self-
fulfillment) 
Challenge and response 




Need for certainty, beliefs 
Creativity and vision of the few 
Cope with few alternatives or 
variables only 
Filter out images inconsistent 
with past experience 
Game playing {"homo 
ludens") 
Focus on simplistic hypotheses 
rather than scanning many 
L e a d e r s a n d f o l l o w e r s , 
mystique 
Fear of change and the 
unknown 
Narrative (story), discussion, 
speech 
Importance of personality 
<Í8 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
"The classic development approach has 
been to sound the alarm and then, confident 
that the country's attention has been gained, 
to tell it what will have to be done if it is to 
avoid losing its resource base. It has not 
worked. It has not failed because it has 
ignored (as if it were some mere detail of 
implementation) the deep political, eco-
nomic and cultural structure that is, in fact, 
what determines the country's attention or 
lack of attention. What is needed is a more 
sensitive approach; an approach that places 
the 'mere details' —the institutions that 
constitute this deep structure— at the very 
centre of the stage and relegates to the wings 
the alarm bellringers and their immaculate 
prescriptions." 
These authors argue that the traditional T pers-
This final section will turn to speculation on the 
kinds of insights which the perspectives are 
likely to bring to the surface in the area of devel-
opment planning. They are based on several of 
the sources quoted in this article. 
The T perspective: 
The dominant technology for the next 25 
years will be information technology. Rapid 
advances in data processing, storage, and com-
munication will mean that "information will be 
the coin of the realm". 
— Information technology can provide a devel-
oping country with the ability to take quan-
titative leaps forward. For example, learning 
through visual means (video cassettes, net-
works) can overcome lags in literacy and a 
lack of trained teachers. 
— Information technology can overcome the 
discounting problem (Linstone, 1984:350). 
— The possibilities of unacceptable 
technology-based catastrophes are 
multiplying. 
— Identification of complex, tightly-coupled 
systems in which failure results in enormous 
consequences can make the elimination of 
such systems more likely (Perrow, 1984). 
pective —the biophysical analysis— must yield 
"the spotlight to the O perspective: 
(Oj) micro-social 
The framework of land tenure within the 
village and the patterns of local social relation-
ships lead to a differentiation in strategies 
between the cautious cultivators (for whom land 
is wealth) and the adventurous traders (for 
whom individualized exchange is wealth). 
(02) macro-social 
The trans-boundary problems are the focus: 
what happens in one country is seen as having 
unfortunate downstream effects in another 
country. Mutually satisfactory national policies 
and their implementation are of prime concern. 
It is the interaction or cross-cuing among T, 
Op and 02 that is crucial to effective planning for 
development in this region. 
The 0 perspective: 
Greater process orientation and an institu-
tional focus improve planning effectiveness 
(Linstone, 1984:331-352). 
— More attention is focused on matching tech-
nological with social change. 
— The bottom-up development process is 
matched with the top-down development 
project (Thompson and Warburton, 
1985:29). 
— In industrial development, the planner's 
attention is balanced more equitably 
between a) technology and b) manage-
ment/manufacturing/marketing. In other 
words, the gap between planning and imple-
mentation is reduced. 
— Adaptability, flexibility, and crisis manage-
ment are emphasized in the development 
process. 
The P perspective: 
There ¡s a greater focus on the identification 
and nourishing of individuals with vital talents 
rather than merely the improvement of educa-
tion and training. 
Ill 
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— Leaders are needed: individuals with a 
vision, the ability to engage others in its 
pursuit, and personal staying power. 
— Entrepreneurs are needed: risk takers. 
— Managers are needed (in distinction to 
bureaucrats). 
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